

concerned citizens for nuclear safety

107 Cienega St. Santa Fe, NM 87501 505-986-1973 Tel 505-986-0997 Fax ccns@nuclearactive.org www.nuclearactive.org



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108 individuall	y signed	comment lette	(MS/beration ers for inclusion in	ભ્ય ે ૧ the Pubic
Comment Reco	ord for the	e July 6, 2009 r	evised draft New	Mexico
Environment D	epartmer	nt Hazardous	Waste Permit for	Los Alamos
National Labor	atory.			
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Dated:	·	2009.		
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	Sign For:		Waste Bureau	totaitment

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Date: 8/8/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.nm.us

Dear Mr. Kieling:

- 1. STOP Open Air Burning of Hazardous Waste. I object to NMED allowing DOE/LANL to use the open air for burning 12,500 pounds of hazardous waste each year. The open burning releases poisons into the air we breathe, which poses a direct threat to the wildlife, public health and the environment. In 2004, NMED stopped the open burning of household trash because of toxic emissions. I support NMED requiring DOE/LANL to install a confined burn facility as an alternative to open burning.
- 2. "Alternative Requirements" Do Not Protect Groundwater. Many reports over the past five years have described the overall failure of the DOE/LANL to protect the precious groundwater resources from contamination by LANL sources of chemical and nuclear wastes. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the DOE Inspector General and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) have written detailed reports that describe the major problems in the DOE/LANL groundwater protection practices and lack of compliance with the regulations.
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- **3. Public Participation Must Be Early, Often, Meaningful and Continuous.** The EPA has issued enhanced public participation requirements for **early, often, meaningful and continuous contact with the public** about cleanup of the old LANL dump sites that are known as MDAs. The 25 dumps contain "legacy waste" which are dangerous mixtures of chemical and radionuclide wastes. The LANL Legacy Waste Dump Sites include MDAs G, H and L at Technical Area 54 (TA-54) and MDAs A, B, T, U and V at TA-21. DOE/LANL have been lax in fulfilling public participation requirements for the cleanup of the 25 LANL MDAs, such as providing access to documents and opportunities for public input into the decision-making processes and holding public meetings. Further, DOE/LANL is required to establish an **Information Repository** where permit documents are readily available to the public.

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- 7. Additional Comments.

Sincere l y, Name:	Alana Narayio	
Address:	Santa Clara Pre blo	
Email:		

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Date: 7-24-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Penel	lope M	c Mullen	PM.	Mulle	m, SL
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Email:						

Date:

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Sincerely, Name:	Candace Rulb
Address:	369 MMUGUNA HUA 529
Email:	

Date: 7/29/09

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Sincerely, Name:	
Address:	25 tip. VCG. DAMAS 11-75285
Email:	,

Date: 12/25/09

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7. Additional	It would seem that the NMED has no regard for
own ch	ildren's future let alone the planet we live
on. I	ildren's future let alone the planet we live am appalled that CCNS has to exist.
	Margery Odell
Address:	726 Allendale St, SF, NM 87505
Email:	

Date: 7.29.09

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Sincerely, Name:	Dary Rich Osa
Address:	225 anita Pl apt D, Sartak, NM87505
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Date: July 26, 2009

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Sincerely, Name:	Minding Kan	ws		
Address:	16 valut	ر مردما	Espanol	NM
Email:		//		<i></i>

Date: 7/26/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Mizaha Jackson MIZAHA JACKSON
Address:	2822 DON QUXOTE SANTA FE NM
Email:	ma na

Date: 7 · 29 · 09

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Sincerely, Name:	Aouar Heope	
Address:	P.O. Box 649 Akalde NM 87511	
Email:		

Date: 7 . 30 . 09

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Sincerely, Name:	Krusten mester	
Address:	1622 PASEO CONQUISTADORA	Sante te
Email:		\$7501

Date: 8/11/09

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Sincerely,

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Address:

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Date:	1-16-0	
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Sincerely, Name:	Mollie Walfor	
Address:		
Email:	nuspure smal.com	

Date: 7/26/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Marken tucko
Address:	P. 6 BOX 11100- Englewood 0 8015
Email:	/

Date: 7/25/09

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Sincerely,	Kanta The III
Name:	Jarace Millian
Address:	4 Collecte Place Santa To 87508
Addless.	(
Email:	

Date: $\frac{7/26/69}{}$

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	MATT DONOVAN			
Address:	1053 Alto St	SF NM	77501	
Email:	***************************************			

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Sincerely, Name:	Meal A.R.	Diland
Address:	1263 CAMINO MONTE CIELO	22
Email:	ppilando emathunki Net	

Date: 7/26/09

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Sincerely, Name:	LINDA E YOUNG	Sinda C. Joung	
Address:	Co Rd 230 # 27 E/	Rito, MM 87536	
Email:	lindinhal954 avahoo.	com	

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Date: 7-27-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Cest	thomas	(CLIFF THOMAS)
Address:		551 W.	CORDOVA RD.
Email:		cliff@e	lectricaid, net

Date: 7-27-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Joanna Kennedy
Address:	903 W. Alaneda #763, SF, NM 8750
Email:	joani Ken@ ear Thlink. Net

Date: $\frac{7}{21} / \frac{09}{9}$

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Sincerely, Name:	The fillo CFNP			
Address:	530 - A Harkle Rd.	SF	87505	
Email:				***************************************

Date: 15 August 2009

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely,	
Name:	

Address:

Email:

Marilyn Winter-Jankin #2 Allegero Dr., Santa Fe, NM 87505 MARILYNWT @ ComCAST. NET

Date: 7/21/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Kim Caylor
Address:	263 Camido del Olmo, SFNM 87501
Email:	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

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Date: 7/27/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Linis Rojus	
Address:	142 Valley Dr SFR 8754	-
Email:	Luis Alfonso Rojas pad con	

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Address:	331	CAMINO	CHICO, SF, NM, 8750
Email:			

Date: 7/27/09

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Sincerely, Name:

Address:

Email:

Ryan Shaening Pokrasso

SF, NM 8750

vail-com

Date: 7/29/09

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Address:	POB 25068 8F, NM 87592	
Email:		

Date: 7 27 09

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Sincerely, Name:	Natasya Gundersen Agundasu
Address:	1 250 Jacona Rd. Santa Fo MM 87506
Email:	

Date: 7/27/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Reid	Pierce	Re		
Address:	903 6	lio Vis	tu St	Santa	fe
Email:	reldage	Herce @	graph.	m	

Date: 8-26-09

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Sincerely.	Phoelr Hummel
	90 Baboat Thail, Santa Fe, NM 87505

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Email:

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Sincerely, Name:	Tyme I haw Lynne L. Trew
Address:	369 monterma Ave #243 Santate UM 8750
Email:	

Date: 7 27 09

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Sincerely, Name:	Jun	WX	non			
Address:	135	Seveno	Dr.	SF	97501	***************************************
Email:						

Date: 1/27/09

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	Ca Shu	
Sincerely, Name:	Carol Schrader	
Address:	2300 W. Alameda A6	
Email:		

Date: ____7/27/09

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Address:	108	CA.	GOLONDIPINA	Santa FE NM 87501
Email:	(0		,	

Date: 08/17/09

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Sincerely,	A. Please do something to prevint this water	ر
Name:	and soil contamination	
Address:	Drilley Escott mp	
Email:	PO FOX 2 6 70	
	Santa fr. nom 87500	

Date: 7/29/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Thererpen	Sheree Press	
Address:	107 Camino Del	Campo Santate, No	n 87501
Email:	Fuzzlyspider@ Ho	tmail. com	

Date: $\frac{7}{27}/09$

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Sincerely, Name:	Mat Williams Alt Allema
Address:	69 E. Istanda Calabasa Santa Fe, NM, 8866
Email:	

Date: 7/25/09

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Sincerely, Name:	arthu	r First	enleng		
Address:	Bex	6216,	Santa	7e, NM	87502
Email:	,		`		

Date: July 25, 2009

John E. Kieling, Program Manager
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Sincerely,

Name:

Address:

Email:

JORGAD MINKIN

2207 Vela ST

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Sincerely, Name:	Licole Morris
Address:	17 Camino Largo, Santa Fe, NM 875507
Email:	brigo congo la cupermera. em

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Address:	A38 PRODROA HILL, SANTANE, NM 87501
Email:	

Date: 7-25-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Thane Schaffer
Address:	119 Apache Canyon Trail, Santa Fe, NM 87505
Email:	dianegailschaffer@yahov.com

Date: 7-25-09

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Sincerely, Name:	YOLANDA DE SCHEPPEN	
Address:	PO BD 31025	
Email:	Santa FEMM P7594	

Date: 7-25-09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Email: KERORDI Q wild blue . re

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Date.	1	

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Sincerely, Name:

Address:

Email:

Date: 1/26/09

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Sincerely, Name:	5Ce	MT SHI	JKCR	
Address:	1616	PASEO	CONQUISTABORA	SAWAFE NM 8750
Email:				

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Sincerely, Name:		
Address:	LZZ Pan 1:3 ST NH 87505	
Email:	donderce yahoo. com	

Date: 7/26/09

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Address:	2300	W. 7	Taneda	B3,	Santate	Sm 8750
Email:						-

Date: 7/26/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Ann Sutton	_	
Address:	PUB7 5957	SE 87704	
Email:		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

Date:	7-26-09	
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John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:

Address:

Email:

Date: 2/7/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Ursula t	Hofer_	-	
Address:	2019 Ga	listeo 81.	Unit M-3	Sank Fe
Email:	Maria.			WH POO

Date: July 26, 2009

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Del	rowal	Q; ve	er Son	`			
Address:	100	Cibe	• ,		an ta	Fr.	NM	8750
Email:	josta	stren	gth @) yah	00,4	m		

Date: 8.15.09

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Sincerely, Name:	K WYLIE		
Address:	PO BOX 254	54NTA FE NU 87504	
Email:	-		

Date: 7-26.09

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Sincerely, Name:	It Kn Stere Kopelmin	
Address:	475 Canino don Enilis SF 87507	
Email:		

Date: <u>1-26-09</u>

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Sincerely, Name:	Samuel P. Pountage	-1
Address:	9A-CRS Espanla NM 8753L	
Email:		

Date: 7/26/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Tess Bliven
Address:	506 Ersett St. Santa fe NM. 87501
Email:	Zeartheprite@yorhoo.com

Date: 14 aug 09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager
Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department
2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1
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E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	John + Drâne Forsdale.
Address:	109 Valley Dr. SF 87501
Email:	

Date: 8/23/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Linda	Sorans	W-555//-	*		···
Address:		Silver Peak	PI	NE,	ABQ, N	m, 8711
Email:	linda . 3	iorant @ yar	100.0	om		
		J				

Date: July 26, 2009

John E. Kieling, Program Manager
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Sincerely,

Name:

Address:

The Camino les Objectos SENIM 87508

Email:

Kaitlis alley a gnail com

Date: July 26 09

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Sincerely, Name:	M. K. Nester	
Address:	65A Canino Chupadero	
Email:		-

Date: 7/27/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Robert Hisch Willet And
Address:	120 Ca Joya Rd S.F. N.M.
Email:	Thirsch 808 (a) hotmail aim

Date: 7/21/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Flat Goskon Hall
Address:	Gen. Delivery Dixon, NM F7527
Email:	

Date: 8/24/09

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Sincerely, Name:	JOSEPH OLIANO SEL	
Address:	1119 Gille Del Cield Sante NM 87507	_
Email:	joliaro @ cyhermesa. com	

Date: 7/27/09

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Sincerely, Name:	ROB Thanes				
Address:	24 Monterey	Rd	S.S.	W.M.	87508
Email:	inlakesh(a)	inlake	sh. (a		

Date: 7/26/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Email:

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Sincerely,

Name:

Address:

Email:

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a Crenga,

hotmail, com

Date:

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Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department

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Sincerely, Name:	RAUL THACHER	Val a M
Address:	P.D BOX 14, TESU	ova. Nm. 87574
Email:		

Date: 7/27/09

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Address:	1119 Se	Plata Circle	STNM87501
Email:			

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Address:	206A Carraba Pd.	SF 87501 5
Email:		

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Address: _	fg Ric Vista PL SF	NA 87501
Email:	caznola Damail - com	

Date: $\frac{7/26/09}{}$

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Sincerely, Name:	Shoma T	Beach		
Address:	17/9 Sa	a Fe	h. ho-9750	Sif
Email:			•	

Date: $\frac{7/27/69}{}$

John E. Kieling, Program Manager
Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department
2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303
E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Rose	Surba	4		
Address:	209	Spice	1070	nm	87501
Email:	/				

Date: July 27, 2009

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Sincerely,
Name:

Address:

Email:

Pavid Wheeler

San Jose NM 87565

Date:

John E. Kieling, Program Manager

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Sincerely,

Name:

Address:

Email:

Inudia Fresp of Jonathan

Sinta Fe Mm 8750)

Date: 7.24.09

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Sincerely, Name:	Richelle Elder	
Address:	ZLOID Campo Verde SF NM 87505	
Email:	richelle, Elder é yahoo, com	

Date: 8.14.09

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Sincerely, Name:	Amel h. M. Reyon	
Address:	2161 Middlefie IC Rd.	Cleveland How In 44/06
Email:		

Date: 7,24.09

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Sincerely, Name:	Talad	Lehme		
Address:	163010	Lapry Trail	Lamy, NM	87540
Email:	leland e	Mother Media . org		

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Sincerely, Name:

Address:

Email:

Mary Forise Ories

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Date: 7 - 24 · 69

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Sincerely, Name:	and hulle
Address:	(West)
Email:	carolneller Drewnegges. com

Date:	7-24.09	
Date.		

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Address:	The Shoral St.	
Email:		

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Address:	970 Achina Made S.T. NM.	,
Email:	<u> </u>	

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Sincerely, Name:	Peter Moon
Address:	322A Cam. Cerrito Ste MM 87505
Email:	noom.peter@amail.com

Date:	7.	24	.09		
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- 3. Public Participation Must Be Early, Often, Meaningful and Continuous. The EPA has issued enhanced public participation requirements for early, often, meaningful and continuous contact with the public about cleanup of the old LANL dump sites that are known as MDAs. The 25 dumps contain "legacy waste" which are dangerous mixtures of chemical and radionuclide wastes. The LANL Legacy Waste Dump Sites include MDAs G, H and L at Technical Area 54 (TA-54) and MDAs A, B, T, U and V at TA-21. DOE/LANL have been lax in fulfilling public participation requirements for the cleanup of the 25 LANL MDAs, such as providing access to documents and opportunities for public input into the decision-making processes and holding public meetings. Further, DOE/LANL is required to establish an Information Repository where permit documents are readily available to the public.

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Address:	601 COMING RONGHE DOS SF	-			
Email:					

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Address:	964 Alto St. Santa Fe, NM 87501
Email:	gypsy. 22.5 (Dhotmail.com

Date: 7/25/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Alizabeth Sigh- many Sughi	
Address:	1706 Calleym Voronia, Som Date	
Email:		

Date: 8 (10 09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager
Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department
2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303
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Sincerely, Name:	Alice Ladas	•	
Address:	2300W Alaneda	C2-Saute Fe	10158 MM,
Email:	Aladas @ ad. com		

Date: July 25 200

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Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department

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Sincerely, Name:	Michael	en					
Address:	1572	Center	Dr.	# €	CarterFe	Wa	87508
Email:							

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Sincerely, Name:	1. Harmandt	
Address:	POBOX 1764 SFAM 87504	
Email:		

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Name: Address:	1012 MARQUET PLACE SUITE 21/ ST,NM)
Email:	

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Sincerely, Name:	REU STRIAR
Address:	147 CASTLAR CIECUS. S. L. 8750
Email:	ALLC PLATIO MON. Com

Date: July 24,2009

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Taylor Selly
Address:	5018 Agua Fratk Rd SF WW
Email:	

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Sincerely, Name:	Den Hore	
Address:	51 GALLE GURULE SFNM	-
Email:		

Date: July 24, 2009

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john:kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Shirley Koley	
Address:	337. Don Cuber Pl	
Email:	Sant Fe, NM	87505

Date: July 24, 2069

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Sincerely, Name:	maria Crestina Late		
Address:	1614 BEN HURDS.	SF	8750/
Email:	·		

Date: 7/24/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Cynthia Koeng	
Address:	131 Seveno Drive, Santa Fe, NM 87501	
Email:	kcynthiz 6 @ yakoo. com	

Date: 7-24.09

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Sincerely, Name:	uit y	
Address:	134 CALLE DON JOSE	SF, UM 87501
Email:	NIA	

Date: 8 14 09

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Sincerely, Name:	JA Klauck		•	
Address:	BEX 10200	SF	87504	
Email:	dokedog@gmail.	CEM		

Date: August 20, 2009

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Please do the right thing.

Sincerely, Name:	Ellen Kemper	•
Address:		
Email:	Ms Ellen Kemper 2300 W Alameda St Apt B1 Santa Fe, NM, 87507	

Date: 7 - 24 . 09

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Sincerely, Name:	Leur Rasmunen	
Address:	Selmedalsa. 8, 129 36 Hägersten	Sweden
Email:	1044. Yasmussen of oftokonsult. se.	

Date: 7-24.09

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- 7. Additional Comments.

Sincerely, Name:	Joti A Dewey		
Address:	1916 ROSS PR. SE Apt C	ABR	87108
Email:			

Date: 7 - 24.09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Griet Laga.	
Address:	Upper Canyon Rd.	
Email:	Santa Fe NM - 87501	

Date: 7-24.09

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I object to NMED allowing DOE/LANL to continue to manage hazardous waste without the necessary studies of the seismic hazard and without a reliable network of seismometers. NMED must conduct a full investigation into the recommendations from these seismic reviews before the permit is finalized for the hazardous waste management units.

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Sincerely, Name:	Mark Higa	
Address:	551 W. Cordons Rd #382 SF	3 7505
Email:		