Loretto Community
Sisters and Comembers
NM Office
113 Camino Santiago
Santa Fe, NM 87501
505-983-1251



## **RECEIPT**

Hazardous Waste Bureau

I, _	, received
182	consideration and comment letters for insertion into the NMED Public Comment Record
for the Jul	y 6, 2009 revised draft New Mexico Environment Department Hazardous
Waste Per	rmit for Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Dated: _	, 2009.
Signature For: Ne	w Mexico Environment Department

Date: 8-11-19

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us 182

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Sincerely, Name:	7 Nangenneludianos
~	3109 1 Nonteguma # 284, 5 F 8750
Email:	

Date:  $\frac{9/10/2009}{}$ 

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Sincerely, Name:	ada Broune	ADA BROWNE
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Sincerely, Name:	Us. I Cha	n 24 0/1/		
Address:	234 Espican	5+ 5 ma	Fo Man	£750)
Email:	<i>y</i> • <i>y</i> • <i>y</i>			

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Sincerely, Name:	Lexi Hoskin Latan
Address:	1101 W. Alameda Santa Fe NM 87501
Email:	lexi_bug-15@yahoo.com

Date: 8-11-19

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Email:	

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Email:	·	

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Sincerely, Name:	Vara / hatcher
Address:	80 B Calle Estevan
Email:	SF 87507

Date: 8/10/2009

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- 7. Additional Comments.

Sincerely, Name:	Larde Kellyg
Address:	1457 Sonter Croz Pr Sonter Fr NM 67505
Email:	

Date: 8-22-09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.nm.us

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- 3. Public Participation Must Be Early, Often, Meaningful and Continuous. The EPA has issued enhanced public participation requirements for early, often, meaningful and continuous contact with the public about cleanup of the old LANL dump sites that are known as MDAs. The 25 dumps contain "legacy waste" which are dangerous mixtures of chemical and radionuclide wastes. The LANL Legacy Waste Dump Sites include MDAs G, H and L at Technical Area 54 (TA-54) and MDAs A, B, T, U and V at TA-21. DOE/LANL have been lax in fulfilling public participation requirements for the cleanup of the 25 LANL MDAs, such as providing access to documents and opportunities for public input into the decision-making processes and holding public meetings. Further, DOE/LANL is required to establish an Information Repository where permit documents are readily available to the public.

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Sincerely, Name:	SITH HAMIESM CADDLE	
Address:	915 Wenzo 87. 85 NM 87501.	
Email:		

Date: 8-6-09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	La Debagh-Store Liz Debaugh-Stone
Address:	10565 Power Channel Ellecost City MD
Email:	

Date: 8/3/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Sarah	g dolpes	tad Sar	ah J. Sto	(pestad)
Address:	9 Via	de Zorrit	os Banta	Fe NM	87506
Email:		·			

Date: 8 - 3 - 09

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Sincerely, Name:	eah	(Mbo)		
Address:		Moore	5/	SFFFSOL
Email:				

Date: 8 - 3 - 09

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Sincerely, Name:	Colleen McKeann
Address:	900 Gilberslave St., Santa Fe, NM 87505
Email:	Cebrickeonnagnail.com
	$\mathcal{L}$

Date:	
Date.	

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Sincerely, Name:	Susan Noel Dan Macl
Address:	820 2: a lone Espanola NM 87532
Email:	suercel Daybernesa. com

Date: 8-3-09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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- 7. Additional Comments.

Sincerely, Name:	Rasko C. Hadron
Address:	1622 Carillos Rl. #4
Email:	rahuds @ g.mail. com

Date: 3 August 2009

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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	Merjan Andris Ohlmin	
Sincerely, Name:	Miryam Andrews-Ohlman	
Address:	3832 Botanical, St. Louis MO 63110	
Email:	Minjam. andrewso Egmail com	
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Date:  $3 \cdot 69$ 

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely,	Michael Molman
Name:	The west of the wine
Address:	3832 Boranical Av St. Louis, Mo. 63110
Email:	

Date: 8 - 3 - 09

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Address:

Email:

rojos, Sonta Fe, NM 875

Date: 9-3-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Cheryl Any Burle is	
Address:	Santa Fe, New Mexico	
Email:	Climbinjunkiela yahoo. com	

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Address:	17210 Camero Dos	alouis # 15 SF NM8707
Email:		

Date: 8/3/09

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Email:	105t3 (2) transra)is	

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Sincerely, Name:	Elizabeth Mill			
Address:	214 Verillos	SFNM	87505	
Email:		,,		

Date: 9-11-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Airi Car Alicia Chapman
Address:	4392 Jaguar Drive SF NM 87507
Email:	aliciabear. c@gmail.com

Date: 8 - 3 - 09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, HOMAS LEMPER

Sincerely, Name:

Address: 214 VALLEROS

Email: DIGBYSTILLS @HOTMAIL

Date: 8 - 3 - 00

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Sincerely, Name:	Chris Chavez Can Can
Address:	311 Pino Rd Santa Fe NM 84501
Email:	

Date: 8-3-09

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	Cloud C
Sincerely, Name:	Claude Convisser
Address:	277-B Irvine St.
Email:	Janta Pe, NM 87101

Date: 8-3-09

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Sincerely, Name:	wall Takonken	
Address:	13031 ge Central NBK, NM	
Email:	1: - hteverles que falace.	

Date: 8/3/69

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Email:

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Sincerely, Name:	Shalimar Korbs	
Address:	6024 Monte Agulpi SF. NM 87507	
Email:	Shelina, kirebs @gmail.com	

Date:  $\frac{8/3/\delta 9}{2}$ 

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Address:	P.O. Box 185	Alcalde, N.M. 87511
Email:		(

Date:  $\frac{6/3/\delta \dot{q}}{}$ 

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Sincerely,

Name:

Email:

Address:

aaress:

will haukins Domneast, net,

87505

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Sincerely, Name:	Genet Franklin, CSJ	
Address:	410 State Road 510 Santa Fe, NM 87506	
Email:	Markha Onewnepico. Com	

Date: 7-31-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Sylame Helle	
Address:	1509 Richeco St-#111	
Email:	Stend FE NY 87505	

Date: 7 - 3| - 09

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Sincerely, Name:	Lydia Garcia	
Address:	PO BOX 493, TOOS NM 87571	
Email:	Plydia 07@ yahoo.com	

Date: 1-3|-09

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Address:	Bip 11- SP 87504	
Email:		

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Address:	1120 Summit Dr NE, Alb NM 97100
Email:	K bierbaume hotmail-com

Date: 1-31-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Gregory Hollier	
Address:	MO SUMMIT DRIVE Alow, NM 87100	
Email:	abother arm ell	

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Sincerely, Name:

Address:

Email:

Gina forrocks
1404 Cerno Gordo Rd. Santa Te N.M 87501
Water tigger 62@ yahoo.ca

Date: 1 - 31 - 09

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Sincerely, Name:	B.A. OConnor
Address:	P.O.Box 22262, ST. 1/m 87502
Email:	

Date: 7-31-09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Ellen Austra Coldwoll
Address:	132 Romuno 44 Santa Ge NM 8750
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ещан.	

Date: July 31, 2009

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Connie Higdon
Address:	2218 Vuelfa San Morcos Sanfa Fe 87505
Email:	

Date: 3-3-19

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	SOLAR LOW
Address:	8 New Village Are Souta Fe NM
Email:	

Date: 8-3-19

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Sincerely, Name:	CAROL E. MATTESON Cald & Mailain
Address:	Po Box 804 Mc Minneille, Dr. 97128
Email:	

Date: 3/3/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Deborate W. Read	ie Reliamine.	Sende
Address:	117 Duran St	Santa Fe NM 87	501 - 1817
Email:			

Date: 8-3-09

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Address:	504, ONATE PL. ST. NM. 87501
Email:	

Date: 8-3-09

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Address:	1719 Avenida Cristobal Colon	SantaFENM8701
Email:	1. Indiasky @ gmail. com	

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Sincerely, Name:	Shall	Smit	<b>.</b>	Shizley	Smitt
Address:	918	05ACL	Ase	SE	91505
Email:				Vitalian ,	

Date: <u>9-3-09</u>

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Email:

Date: 1-3|-09

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Sincerely, Name:	(Unlit L. (Loylan)
Address:	57 Cousar Canyon Sarta Fr. N.M. 87508
	- Jagor Congression Strong
Email:	

Date: 7-31-09

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Sincerely, Name:	DYANE HARRIS
Address:	57 COUGAR CANGON, SF, NM 87508
Email:	

Date: 1-31-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Earl Pohlo
Address:	2540 Caux or RINKON BUNKS, JAMA. FS, NA 8)505
Email:	EARC RUHLEDER @ MEN. Com

Date: 8-3-09

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<	
Sincerely, Name:	JAY STOLPESTAN
Address:	GVIA DE ZORRITOS
Email:	 SANTA RE, NM87506

Date: 8-3-09

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Sincerely, Name:		MEGAN (	TREEL	<b>/</b>	
Address:	105	CALLE PINON	IERO	S.FN.1	1,8750
Email:	den.	auxirs Que	Lhoo, e	00	

Date: 8/6/09

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- 3. Public Participation Must Be Early, Often, Meaningful and Continuous. The EPA has issued enhanced public participation requirements for early, often, meaningful and continuous contact with the public about cleanup of the old LANL dump sites that are known as MDAs. The 25 dumps contain "legacy waste" which are dangerous mixtures of chemical and radionuclide wastes. The LANL Legacy Waste Dump Sites include MDAs G, H and L at Technical Area 54 (TA-54) and MDAs A, B, T, U and V at TA-21. DOE/LANL have been lax in fulfilling public participation requirements for the cleanup of the 25 LANL MDAs, such as providing access to documents and opportunities for public input into the decision-making processes and holding public meetings. Further, DOE/LANL is required to establish an Information Repository where permit documents are readily available to the public.

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Sincerely, Name:	Genoa Buven
Address:	23. P. 01 Box 4607, Santa Fe, NH87502
Email:	

Date: 8/12/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Letta K Amith EHa S Smith
Address:	118 Camino Santago SF NM 87501
Email:	

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Address:

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Address:	5B Klarissa Court, Santa Te, NM & 7808
Email:	

Date: 9 - 11 - 19

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Sincerely,

Name:

Address:

Email:

JOBRAIN KARCHER

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zerocdesign.com

Date: 8/10/2009

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Address:	2405 Madovia Lapo, Santa Fe NM 8750 E
Email:	

Date: 9-10-09

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Address:	715 Galister St #B Santa Fe N.M. 87505
Email:	Jerry Maostas @ coloniallife. Com

Date: 8/10/2009

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Sincerely, Name:	Arjana Steen	
Address:	nc1 Box 324 Elgin AZ	
Email:	the carpenerta gmail. com	

Date: 8-11-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Grace Willier (GRACE WHIKER)	
Address:	1402 Compar Rd Souts Fe 87505	
Email:		

Date: 8-11-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Matthew Redington Matthew Medington
Address:	1330 Borrego Pass, Sata Fe, NM 87507
Email:	

Date: 9-11-09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Ela K Blacke	wood		
Address:	POBON 195	Tesusue	NM	87574
Email:	- γ ()	δ	,	

Date: 8/6/09

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Sincerely, Name:	DIANNE	RYAN	Yamer Ram	
Address:		ι	ST. SANTAFE 87501	
Email:				

Date: 8-6-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Toy Kincaid			
Address:	22 Encantado	Circle	Santa FE	Wm 87508
Email:	WERDSDY JOYCE @	aol. c	$\omega_{1}$	

Date: 8-6-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Chr. G	ace berge	
Address:	004 Am	ustad P10 SF	8708
Email:			

Date:

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Sincerely, Name:	Pamela Baum gartel PAMELA BAUMGARTEL
Address:	237 Fiesta St , Santa Fe, NM 87501
Email:	

Date: 8 / 0 / 00

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Sincerely,

Name:

Address:

Email:

Melanie West Melanie West

Loop ST NM 87, 108

at photography, com

Date: 8-6-99

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Sincerely, Name:	MARIA SENA, Mario Cona
Address:	123 Placita De Oro Senta Fe, NM 8750)
Email:	Sena_mia@yahoo.com

Date: 8/6/09

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Sincerely, Name:

Address:

Email:

Date: 8/6/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager

Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department

2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303

E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Marguet Baca Margret Baca
Address:	4655 Solecito Loop SFNM 87507
Email:	

Date: 8/6/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Hollis B. Choate	
Address:	2884 Calle Le Molina SF NM	8750
Email:	pappily holly @ yahoo. com	

Date: Aug 6th '09

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Address:	2300 W. Alameda, Santa Fe,	NM 87507
Email:	Casitashaleva yahoo. com	

Date: 8/3/09

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Sincerely, Name:	SHEILA KELEHER	Shale Kelm	ar
Address:		Way Santa Fe NM	87505
Email:			<u> </u>

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Additional Comments.

Email:

Sincerely,
Name: Deana Hickman
Address: Sata fe NM 87.507

Date: 8-11-09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Mary & Dahmen
Address:	35 E Saddleback Mesa
Email:	Senta Te, VM 8750

Date: 8-11-09

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Sincerely, Name: Address:	Jay 3 Fayfield MB Mayfield 1520 Blackbird Rd Rio Rancho Nor 87144
Email:	•

Date:

John E. Kieling, Program Manager

Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department

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	lie Bowman	
Sincerely, Name:	ERIC B Bowman	
Address:	329 F Buena Vista SFNM 87505	
Email:	Prometheus 99 139@ msn.com	

Date: 8 - 6 - 09

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Sincerely, Name:	Taley M. Selles
Address:	719/W. Berger St. Apt #1 Sunta FE, NM 87505
Email:	

Date: 8-6-09

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Address:	201 Pacheca	CANVOR	
Email:			

Date: 8 - 6 - 09

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Sincerely, Name:	Cal Brutley	Carl Brighter	
Address:	PC 3/039	Sada Fi War 8759	4
Email:			

Date: 8/6/04

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	MAXWELL G	ANGOO				
Address:	5 GAVILAN	PLACE	5A ~M	FC,	NM	87508
Email:						

Date: 8-6-09

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Address:	1614	BOW	HurDr.	SFNW.	8750
Email:					

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- 3. Public Participation Must Be Early, Often, Meaningful and Continuous. The EPA has issued enhanced public participation requirements for early, often, meaningful and continuous contact with the public about cleanup of the old LANL dump sites that are known as MDAs. The 25 dumps contain "legacy waste" which are dangerous mixtures of chemical and radionuclide wastes. The LANL Legacy Waste Dump Sites include MDAs G, H and L at Technical Area 54 (TA-54) and MDAs A, B, T, U and V at TA-21. DOE/LANL have been lax in fulfilling public participation requirements for the cleanup of the 25 LANL MDAs, such as providing access to documents and opportunities for public input into the decision-making processes and holding public meetings. Further, DOE/LANL is required to establish an Information Repository where permit documents are readily available to the public.

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Address:	1013 W. Alameda St. Sonta Fe n. m.	_
Email:	<u> </u>	_

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Address:	223N. Grade Jupe #454-Santa Fe
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Address:	147 (alle 0jo Feliz SF	
Email:	n_blouin@yahoo.com	

Date:

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Email:	

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Address:	700 Wilamed 2	St. 8, 7. W. Mur	
Email:			

Date:  $\frac{5/6}{200}$ 

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Address:	132 ROMEROS	4 42 SANTA TO	NMSZal
Email:	-		

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Sincerely,

Name:

Address:

Email:

Sarah EHagekirich

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(m)

Date: 8/0/09

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Address:	130x 31039	SF 87594
Email:		

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Name:	DONALO H. JOHNSON	
Address:	2 GOLDEN RIDGE RUAD	SANTA FE NM 87505
Email:		

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Sincerely, Name:	Duna Ros	
Address:	2300 / Marido Dz	
Email:	duly @ enail account was	

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Address:	Mulissa Montoya Mulissa Montoya 1615 Palomino Ct. Bonta FE NM 87505
Email:	

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Sincerely, Name:	male blemehr	
Address:	15 Jeton Playa Janta Fe NM 87508	
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Date: 8-6-09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:

Address:

Email:

108 Calle Coma Norte

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Date:

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Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department

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Sincerely, Name:	KEMN STONE	
Address:	1116 S. LUNA CIR. SF, NM 87501	
Email:	samuambonam @ hothail. com	

Date: 8 - 22 09

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Address:	327 San	ehez SF	NM	87505
Email:				

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Sincerely, Name:	/teles RS	Marl	- Strabellende
Address:	DS 300 1431	Pross	MM
Email:		)	

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Address:	123 ALAMO DO	SF /8150/
Email:		<u> </u>

Date: 8/09

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Email:

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Email:	

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Sincerely, Name:	Minie Braiman Mini Braiman	
Address:	1719-B Siri Dharma C+ SF 87501	
Email:	minielize a yahoo com	

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Fmail:	

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Address:	325 E. Buena Vista #1	SF 87505
Email:		

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Address:	941 Mercer Santafo NM 87505	
Email:	our minton stuff @ MSn. com	

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Sincerely, Name:	l'iza - lemmes Eliza Hemmes
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John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Shu Bulsa	
Address:	10 Barton rd. SF	
Email:		

Date: \$ \ \ 9

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Address:	86 Quartz Tr. San	ta Fe, N.M. 87505
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Address:	114 SERENO DR SF NM 87501	
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Sincerely, Name:	Marian S. nie	Marian S. Miller
Address:	554 Armijo St.	PantaFe, NM 87501
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Date:	8	00	

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Address:	Sspanola, NM
Email:	

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Address:	4659	Punta Sarrisa	5.F.	NM	87507
Email:	banil	nawke hot	mail	. Ceru	

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Address:	(109 CAMINO SANTIAGO, SANTA FE, NMS/1501
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Address:	P.O. Pex 133 Sente Re NM. 8+501
Email:	

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Box 8431 Sau

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O. Com

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Sincerely, Name:	Curi	e Owers Le Oemer	~~	
Address:			de Polilo	SFNm87505
Email:				

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.nm.us

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Sincerely, Name:	Hyda Maria Dougharty	
Address:	220 Alamo Dr.	
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Address:	Pewor NM 87652	
Email:		

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	Patricia	f	alue	cu		
Sincerely, Name:	PATRICIA	PA	oLucc	Í		
Address:	941	A	RIO	115	ta	
Email:	San	ta_	_Fe	1 -	NM	8750

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Address:	818 W. Monhattan Unit	D 87501
Email:		

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Address:	2390	Camino	Capitan	Santu Fz	NM	87505
Email:						

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Address:	Manna Offield Alse Office Co 121 Fiesta St. Unit D Santa Fe, 87501
Email:	alanna Offield @ yahoo.com

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Sincerely, Name:	LINDA KLOSKA INTO
Address:	Fo. Box 10 fl South F. Non Stroy
Email:	

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.nm.us

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Address:	551 W Cordova	RJ 470	SF, NM 8757	<u>2C</u>
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Address:	903 Alto Street Souta Fe NM 87501
Email:	

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Sincerely, Name:	1/1/2 J. J. Cenabell
Address:	111 Cadi Rd S.F 87505
Email:	

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		•	Emilia	SF, NM	9750)
Email:		<i>J</i>			

Date: 8/09

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Sincerely, Name: Address:	South Mal tristing mimarce (059 6 Scholy lane Cochitifalo NM 87083
Email:	

Date: 8/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Varnera GREEN	
Address:	PO BOX 5887 S.E. NM 87502	
Email:		

Date: 8/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Lila	Wright	hil	Wrigh	As		
Address:	2201	Vuelta	San	Marcos	Santa	Fe	
Email:	_			·			

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Address:	105 Pine Street S.F. N.M
Email:	maisiemarie a yahoo. com

Date: 8/19

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Address:	1006 Don Juan St.; Santo Fe, NM 87501	
Email:		

Date: 8/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Sarah C O'Brien Ich COBam
Address:	2396 Camino Capitan #3 Santa fe NM \$1505
Email:	3chafer_Sarah Ohotmail.com

Date: 8-11-09

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Sincerely, Name:	KERBY GOFORTH Kerby Goforth
Address:	PO BOX 33, MEDANALES, NW 87548
Email:	LUDDITE

Date: 8/11/19

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Sincerely, Name:	J			Judith Coulson	
Address:	Do	Bux	23048	SF WN181302	
Email:					

Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_

John E. Kieling, Program Manager

Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department

2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303

E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Sincerely, Name:	June Cyales	
Address:	ASK TO TERBERO	
Email:		

Date: 9 (1) 19

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Sincerely, Name:	Agnes Chavez	
Address:	POBOX ZA8 EL Prado Np 87529	
Email:	agnes@sube.com	

Date: 8-11-09

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Sincerely, Name:	Chard Raniains
Address:	Blanda St. NMO750
Email:	V ·

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SF 875

87501

Email:

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Name:

Address:

1909 Proctor (

Senta Fe NM 81505

Email:

paned+ bprojects. com

Date: 8 - 11 - 09

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Email:					

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Sincerely, Name:	NIELS R. BORCH	
Address:	DOB 23165 SANTA FE Non 87502	
Email:	NR BORCH @ HOTMAIL. COM	

Date: 8-12-09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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Address:	Bol Paseo de Ca Cuma, Santa Fr NIM 87501
Email:	

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Email:			·		875	01

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Address:	S.F. 87501	
Email:		

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Address:	101 Camillo Sant	Fage
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Address:	125 Camino	Sanliago #	1 Sonta	Fe NM
Email:				M501

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Address: 105 CANINO SANTINGO APIJ SANTAFE, NM 87501248P	Sincerely, Name:	Bill TAylor BILL TAYLOR
	Address:	105 CAMINU SANTINGO-PAIJ SANTA FRIMM 87501248P
	Email:	

Date: 8/12/09

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Sincerely, Name:	Mark S. Mattheon, N. W. B.S.W. M.A. Mark Matthiessen 645 E. Barcelona Rd., ST 87505
Address:	645 E. Barcelona Rd., ST 87505
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Date: 8/12/09

John E. Kieling, Program Manager
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Address:	ELEANOR E. BRESLIN 115 Camiro Santiago S.F. 87501
Email:	- ) carily o santiago

Date:  $9 \sim 11 - 09$ 

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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	An M. W
Sincerely, Name:	STEPHANIE MARIE RIBB
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Email:	ribb ahotmail. com

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Address:	213 Avancon	8750)	-
Email:			

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Address:	288 state Rd	379 Egpanola NM 87532
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Address:	Michael A. Wigil, Michael A. Vigil POBOX 603, Teergue, NM 87574
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Sincerely, Name:	Tany Gilchrist	NANCY GILCHRIST
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Email:		

John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

Dear Mr. Kieling:

I make the following public comments about the revised draft Hazardous Waste Permit for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), which will allow the Department of Energy (DOE) and LANL to handle ¼ million pounds of hazardous waste each year during the 10-year permit.

- 1. STOP Open Air Burning of Hazardous Waste. I object to NMED allowing DOE/LANL to use the open air for burning 12,500 pounds of hazardous waste each year. The open burning releases poisons into the air we breathe, which poses a direct threat to the wildlife, public health and the environment. In 2004, NMED stopped the open burning of household trash because of toxic emissions. I support NMED requiring DOE/LANL to install a confined burn facility as an alternative to open burning.
- 2. "Alternative Requirements" Do Not Protect Groundwater. Many reports over the past five years have described the overall failure of the DOE/LANL to protect the precious groundwater resources from contamination by LANL sources of chemical and nuclear wastes. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the DOE Inspector General and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) have written detailed reports that describe the major problems in the DOE/LANL groundwater protection practices and lack of compliance with the regulations.

I object to the revised LANL draft permit that relies on "alternative requirements" for groundwater protection. The NAS Final Report described the "alternative requirements" in the March 1, 2005 NMED/LANL Consent Order as an important example of the failure of the LANL groundwater protection practices. The use of "alternative requirements" has not worked. For example, dangerous and fast-moving hexavalent chromium was discovered in the regional aquifer over 5 1/2 years ago in wells directly west of the Buckman wells. Santa Fe pumps over 40% of its drinking water from the Buckman wells. No one knows the extent or direction of the hexavalent chromium plume – work done under "alternative requirements" in the Consent Order. In order to protect our precious drinking water, NMED must require DOE/LANL to strictly comply with the groundwater requirements of 40 CFR 264, Sections 90 through 101.

- 4. Emergency Management, Planning, Preparedness and Response. Over the past 10 years, serious deficiencies in the DOE/LANL Emergency Management and Response Division have been found by several government auditing agencies, including the DOE Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office and the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board. The expert reports described serious problems with LANL fire protection before the Cerro Grande Fire of 2000. Now new expert reports describe the ongoing failure to provide fire protection. I object to NMED allowing DOE/LANL to continue to manage hazardous waste without meeting the emergency management, planning, preparedness and response requirements. NMED must conduct a full investigation into the recommendations of the expert reports and require their implementation before the permit is finalized for the 26 hazardous waste management units.
- 5. Seismic Hazard on the Seismically Active Volcanic Pajarito Plateau. A 2007 report described a 50% increase in the seismic hazard at LANL. The 2007 report identified many deficiencies in the knowledge of the seismic hazard but the necessary studies are not being performed. The 2007 report identified the failure of DOE/LANL to install and operate a reliable network of seismic instruments (seismometers) to accurately monitor the seismic hazard from ground motions. The current network consists of only seismometers at three locations that are not kept in calibration.

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Address: P.6. Box 8161, Sentate, NM 87504	Sincerely, Name:	Elizabeth M. Reed Elizabeth M. Reed	
, ,		P.6. Box 8161, Sentate, NM 87504	
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John E. Kieling, Program Manager Hazardous Waste Bureau - New Mexico Environment Department 2905 Rodeo Park Drive East, Building 1 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505-6303 E-mail: john.kieling@state.mn.us

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- 3. Public Participation Must Be Early, Often, Meaningful and Continuous. The EPA has issued enhanced public participation requirements for early, often, meaningful and continuous contact with the public about cleanup of the old LANL dump sites that are known as MDAs. The 25 dumps contain "legacy waste" which are dangerous mixtures of chemical and radionuclide wastes. The LANL Legacy Waste Dump Sites include MDAs G, H and L at Technical Area 54 (TA-54) and MDAs A, B, T, U and V at TA-21. DOE/LANL have been lax in fulfilling public participation requirements for the cleanup of the 25 LANL MDAs, such as providing access to documents and opportunities for public input into the decision-making processes and holding public meetings. Further, DOE/LANL is required to establish an Information Repository where permit documents are readily available to the public.

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Sincerely, Name:	Dorothy Ann Collan	Dordhell Coll
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Sincerely, Name:	JOAN ALK	Jadek
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